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modest: Suffering animals need and deserve far more.
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The recommendations of Ng (2016) are unfortunately representative of what has become the
tragic flaw of Animal Welfare Science (AWS) (Broom 2011, 2016; Dawkins 2006). The scientific
position of AWS has been to acknowledge, on the one hand, the physiological and cognitive
needs and capacities of non-human animals (including their capacity for pain, suffering,
frustration, and even happiness), but, on the other hand, to limit the bearing of this
acknowledgment on animals and situations where the “science is not yet in.”
For example, Ng states that “it is difficult to establish with certainty that any individual animal or
species is capable of feeling and hence that their welfare is a matter of concern.” Although he
immediately goes on to state that “this difficulty must not be over-emphasized” and that the
“feelings and, hence welfare needs, of all mammals, if not all vertebrates” have been
“established in the recent field of affective neuroscience,” he uses the argument of “lack of
knowledge” to draw an unwarranted distinction between farmed and wild animals. Ng states
that because we have “less knowledge of them and less influence over” wild animals, we should
limit our attempts to care for wildlife, and instead our practical duty of care should focus on
farmed animals.
Moreover, Ng attempts to deal with the “world knot” of consciousness by arguing that
behavioral flexibility is an evolutionary indicator of a species’ capacity to feel. This approach is
problematic, as it immediately sets up to exclude certain species: We may fail to observe the
relevant behavioral flexibility because of limits in our methodology, which may be insensitive to
species differences in the nature and degree of behavioral flexibility. We must nevertheless ask
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ourselves: Would we be surprised to learn yet again that, with the proper methodology, yet
another species has the capacity for complex cognitive processing, for feeling?
Ng is right to urge that common sense can “reduce animal suffering,” but not in the ways he
suggests. Knowing that a dog would suffer from confinement or would experience joy from
basking in the sun, should we then be surprised “to learn” that a pig or mouse or tortoise would
do so as well? Should we be surprised to “learn” that a fish can feel pain — and should we be
waiting to try to “prove” it before we stop hurting them (see commentaries on Key 2016)?
Ng is advocating practical ways to reduce the harm done to a great number of animals under
our care and management. Housing, handling, invasiveness, method of killing, etc. are indeed
very real concerns for (but not limited to) farmed, laboratory, and other captive animals.
However, how do we best stand to improve the lives of animals? Do we just continue at a level
where we ask whether 10 cm of extra space may make a positive difference or do we admit and
confront what we all know to be true: that animals do not want to be confined at all and that
the suffering we inflict on them goes far beyond the bounds of either doubt or necessity – or the
scope of incremental improvements in their welfare?
We should be advancing beyond an approach that has come to focus only on mitigating
inhumane extremes under conditions in which animals maintain little agency. We should be
moving toward a “science of animal well-being” that has as its first principle that nonhuman
animals have an interest in the outcomes in their lives, just as we do. As in human research on
well-being, a science devoted to the well-being of animals should be asking “what makes life
worth living?” (Franks & Higgins 2012).
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